It is widely supposed that if there is to be a plausible connection between the truth of a de re attitude report about a subject and that subject's possession of a singular thought, then 'acquaintance'-style requirements on singular thought must be rejected. I show that this belief rests on poorly motivated claims about how we talk about the attitudes. I offer a framework for propositional attitude reports which provides both attractive solutions to recalcitrant puzzle cases and the key to preserving acquaintance constraints. The upshot is that there is an independently motivated response to the principal argument against acquaintance.
Introduction
There is a distinctive way of representing objects which orthodoxy calls entertaining a singular thought. When I look at Leonard the cat and make a judgment I would express by saying 'He is tired', my thought is in an intuitive sense about Leonard. This kind of aboutness has long seemed importantly different to that involved in a thought I might entertain about the first cat to have been born at sea (whichever cat that was). In the second case, the best I am in a position to do is to form a thought which is satisfied by some cat, and which would be perfectly thinkable had that cat never existed. At least in their paradigm cases, singular thoughts are thinkable on the basis of some epistemically rewarding relation to the object in question, and are not thinkable where there is no purported object. While it is controversial how singular thoughts are to be characterized exactly, it is not controversial that there are singular thoughts. Writers from Russell (1910/11) and Evans (1982) to Burge (2007) have suggested that singular thoughts are prerequisites for the possibility of empirical knowledge and perhaps for the possibility of thought per se. Strawson's (1959) massive reduplication thought-experiment suggests that, without singular thoughts, were it to turn out that the actual world consists of qualitative duplicate regions, we would be incapable of entertaining thoughts whose truth-values are determined by our region alone.
On the received view, one entertains a singular thought if and only if one bears a propositional attitude (e.g. belief or desire) to a certain sort of content-namely, a singular content.
Having such a thought about an object is incompatible with its nonexistence. Singular thoughts, we might say, are object-dependent for contentfulness: they are contentful in virtue of there being some object they represent.
1 Since their very contentfulness hinges on their being about a particular object, it is standard to think of the contents expressed by singular thoughts as being object-dependent. According to the Russellian picture assumed here, singular content is sodistinguished by virtue of being partly constituted by the represented objects themselves. (While this assumption will be congenial in what follows, it will not bias the discussion or seriously restrict the proposal's application to those who share it. Everything said will be translatable into a neo-Fregean framework, according to which singular contents contain object-dependent senses.
2 ) 1 The received view is not uncontroversial. Some deny that bearing an attitude to a singular content suffices for entertaining a singular thought (e.g. Récanati, 2012) ; some deny that singular thoughts have much to do with distinctions at the level of content (e.g. Stalnaker, 1984) ; and some support the availability of singular thoughts about non-existent objects (e.g. Crane, 2013) . Still, many of the alternative characterizations will also ultimately be targets of the argument addressed in what follows.
2 McDowell (2009) suggests that the sort of treatment assumed here, which captures phenomena of cognitive significance by keeping track of the representational vehicle by means of which a Russellian content is expressed, is 'a mere notational variant' of the neo- Fregean's (2009, p. 178 (Récanati, 2012, p. 244) . Récanati is explicit that these are entities of the sort to which Russellians have traditionally appealed (p. 13, n. 6).
Page 3 of 39
It has long been tempting to think that part of what explains the distinctive epistemological and semantic features of singular thought is that the availability of such thoughts is subject to a distinctive constraint. Adopting Russell's (1910/11 ) nomenclature, we can call these acquaintance constraints: a subject must be acquainted with an object in order to entertain a singular thought about it. While there is a lively debate about what it is, exactly, to be acquainted with an object (in the term's post-Russellian usage), it has been common to suppose that singular thoughts are subject to a substantive constraint of this sort. As Davies (1981) summarized the extent of the consensus, which has grown little in the interim:
The negative partial answer is that if a person is totally causally isolated from the object then he can have no singular beliefs concerning it. The positive partial answer is that if a person has had frequent perceptual (particularly visual) contact with the object and is able reliably […] to recognize the object […] then he can have singular beliefs concerning it (1981: 97).
I will use 'acquaintance' liberally throughout as an umbrella term for any distinctive requirement bearing family resemblances to the paradigm constraints in the literature. The reader is invited to substitute appearances of 'acquaintance' with her favourite general constraint-whether causal (e.g. Kaplan, 1968) , epistemic (e.g. Evans, 1982) , or cognitivist (e.g. Jeshion, 2010) .
Unfortunately, an influential argument stands in the way of the claim that there is any sort of acquaintance constraint on singular thought. Acquaintance constraints, it is alleged, are incompatible with our best account(s) of the connection between singular thoughts and the way in which we ascribe thoughts in ordinary language-specifically through the use of sentences of the following form:
Alice believes that Benjamin is kind. The next section sets out the classic argument against acquaintance, most recently-and to many convincingly-pressed by Hawthorne and Manley (2012; . It will become clear that even those persuaded by Hawthorne and Manley's careful discussion should be interested in the response defended here. In §2 I outline that response. I advance a powerful and 3 I say that this line of thought is tempting, but it will be clear by the end of the paper that it requires sophistication. Readers who find it antecedently naïve or implausible are encouraged to continue. 4 Both principles are adapted from Hawthorne and Manley (2012, p. 38) .
Page 5 of 39 independently attractive semantic framework for propositional attitude reports in §3, and deploy that framework in § §4-5 to secure the acquaintance-theorist's response. The upshot is that there is an independently motivated response to the dominant argument against acquaintance-theoretic ideology.
The argument from attitude reports
In their (2012), Hawthorne and Manley use HARMONY and SUFFICIENCY to highlight the raft of problem cases known to exist for anyone hoping to endorse the following thesis:
CONSTRAINT: For S to entertain a singular thought about o, S must be acquainted with o.
Call supporters of CONSTRAINT acquaintance theorists. Notice that HARMONY and SUFFICIENCY are not claims of which acquaintance theorists are likely to be especially wary. Part of the prima facie motivation for thinking that there is a distinctive kind of representation in the vicinity falls out of a cursory look at some attitude reporting practices, and part of the prima facie motivation for positing an acquaintance constraint is to explain these practices. The rough idea is this. Suppose Ralph believes, like you and I, that there are spies, and so that there is at least one spy. (The example is due to Quine (1956) .)
(1) Ralph believes that there is at least one spy.
(1*) Ralph believes that $x (Spy(x)) But Ralph has never encountered a spy. His belief is of a mundane, general sort, and would not, unlike (2)-informally regimented as the de re ascription (2*)-be of interest to MI5.
(2) There is some thing such that Ralph believes it to be a spy. is not clear that the subject bears any acquaintance-like relation to the res. And when we look at a sufficiently diverse range of such cases, it becomes clear, given the heterogeneity exhibited, that any constraint that might be said to hold is going to be highly disjunctive, epistemically indistinctive, and causally vacuous. 5 And in that case our three principles are incompatible.
Rather than go through such a series of cases here, I present one representative example where it
is both unclear what acquaintance constraint could be said to obtain and plausible that the relevant de re attitude report is neither false nor deviant.
6
Out of her profound admiration for the spies of MI6, Her Majesty the Queen has decided that each year she will award a Medal of Heroism. Since the files on spies are highly classified, however, she is required to hire an assistant, M, to determine a recipient. She suggests that M award it to the top-performing spy in one of the six continents MI6's spies are posted in.
The next day, M assigns continents to the numbers 1-6 and rolls a fair die. Since it lands on 4, she concludes that the top-performing spy posted in Asia is to receive the honour. M consults the classified records and identifies the agent, who is named 'Bond'. Later, M informs the Queen only that a unique spy has been selected. In her speech congratulating Bond at the clandestine ceremony (from which the Queen is absent), M truly reports:
The Queen believes that Bond is a hero.
Given HARMONY, the Queen believes a singular content, and so by SUFFICIENCY has a singular thought. But despite CONSTRAINT she is in no obvious way acquainted with Bond.
In light of cases of this sort, the consensus is that our three principles are incompatible:
'If one accepts HARMONY [and SUFFICIENCY] , one has to give up acquaintance as a constraint on singular thought' (Récanati, 2010, pp. 167-8) . If that is right, acquaintance-theoretic ideology is indeed 'a dispensable relic of a bygone era' (Hawthorne and Manley, 2012, p. 25) . Now this would be a profound conclusion. As Jeshion (2014) Acquaintance-lovers will want to take a hard look at HARMONY and SUFFICIENCY. SUFFICIENCY, as Hawthorne and Manley put it, is 'simply a consequence of a common characterisation of singular thought ' (2012, p. 38) . As for HARMONY, some philosophers (Schiffer, 1978, p. 181; Récanati, 1993, p. 362) have argued that while Russellian singular contents are expressed by the 'that-' clauses of attitude reports, they are just not the kind of thing which could be the 'complete content' of a thought, for they will fail to reflect facts about cognitive significance. To believe a singular content is, rather, to believe it under some mode of presentation or 'guise'. These philosophers will take issue with the letter of HARMONY. However, they will not thereby find anything untoward in its spirit, since they can easily allow that de re belief reports require for their truth that the subject believe a 'quasi-singular' content (Schiffer, 1978, p. 182 ): a singular content 7 Compare Evans' (1982, p. 199 ) remark on the implications of tying the presence of a singular thought to the 'rag-bag category' of cases in which we are inclined to use certain psychological idioms. There is a range of alternative strategies one might deploy in response to the argument from attitude reports, each with venerable endorsements: rejecting HARMONY (Bach, 2014, p. 457) ; espousing an error-theory about ordinary language attitude ascriptions (Kaplan, 1989, p. 555, n. 71) ; construing what counts as acquaintance as context-dependent (Chalmers, 2011) ; or claiming that acquaintance is not a de facto constraint but a normative, de jure constraint which may be violated in practice (Récanati, 2010) . The response I recommend emerges from an independently attractive framework which offers solutions not only to the acquaintance-theoretic puzzles represented by (3) but to a wealth of recalcitrant attitude-reporting data. This is a virtue which few of the above strategies have manifested. And while this strategy has its own small but venerable tradition (see below), it has yet to be explicitly developed. unrestricted exportation' (see Borg (2004) , Harman (1977) , Quine (1977) , and Sosa (1970) Whether one counts as an acquaintance-theorist or a weak liberal will depend on the operative notion of acquaintance. On its Russellian (1910/11) interpretation, acquaintance-theorists will be scarce. But if 'acquaintance' is viewed as a term exhausted by its role in characterizing whatever constraints on singular thought there are, weak liberalism will cease to be an interesting category.
I will not be taking any stances here, since my aim is only to show that even those with heavy duty conceptions of acquaintance have available an attractive and non-ad hoc response to the argument from attitude reports. (2012, p. 247) . And this is a good thing. For it seems scarcely plausible that there should be a notion with the epistemological and semantic import mentioned at the outset whose conditions for being realized are trivial or vacuous. Their worry, rather, is that 'muddled ideas about acquaintance' are liable to counteract whatever progress is made on 'the role of object representations in our cognitive economy' (2012, p. 248).
So while Hawthorne and Manley's (2012) contribution to the debate concerning the requirements on entertaining a singular thought is a negative one, they are at least amenable to the view that something distinguishes episodes of singular thought from those of descriptive thought. Canvassing options for the weak liberal in response to cases like (4), Hawthorne and Manley suggest that perhaps whenever a thinker believes there to be a unique F she either habitually does or easily can form a mental file or tag which is referential. But of course, Alice's description is indefinite. Alternatively, they suggest, perhaps there are situations where singular thought itself is easy to come by (2012, p. 51) . In contexts where (4) comes out true, it is true in virtue of Alice possessing a singular thought. However, I take it that if singular thought itself turns out to be a heavily situation-dependent phenomenon, it will be of limited theoretical interest, and incapable of sustaining the epistemological and semantic roles with which it is associated. 12 The strategy I recommend here, then, is likely to be refreshing, not only for the 12 On the claim that strong liberalism collapses into a kind of eliminativism about singular thought, see Goodman (2017) and Récanati (2010, p. 168 ). Hawthorne and Manley seem willing to concede this result (2012, p. 52, n. 32).
Page 12 of 39 noble acquaintance-theorist, but for anyone persuaded by Hawthorne and Manley's (2012) who has come to see strong liberalism for the radical position that it is.
In this paper, I clarify and develop a view of the connection between singular thoughts and de re attitude reports which has been suggested by Evans (1982) , Peacocke (1983 ), Chalmers (2011 , and most recently Goodman (2013; 2017) . I argue that in addition to being independently attractive, it allows us to maintain both CONSTRAINT and HARMONY while also, as a bonus, preserving the classic acquaintance-theoretic explanation of (2)'s falsity at the imagined context.
While one of the upshots is that SUFFICIENCY must be rejected in its unqualified form, there is a robust sense in which it remains universally true, and its use in the acquaintance-theoretic explanation of (2)'s falsity can be retained. Insofar as sacrifices must be made concerning the SUFFICIENCY principle, then, these should come to seem independently plausible. What has made the liberal's argument compelling is an implicit, poorly-motivated semantics. And once we have a semantics which is sensitive to the subtleties of our ascription practices, a wealth of puzzlesand the principal argument against acquaintance-fall away. 
Contextualism and singular thought
Contextualists about attitude ascriptions think that constructions of the form 'S Φs that p', where 'Φ' is some propositional attitude verb (e.g. 'believes'), are context-sensitive. It is possible for two speakers to literally and sincerely assert 'S Φs that p' and 'It is not the case that S Φs that p', respectively, and for each to speak truly. Where this occurs, the contexts at which these sentences 13 Broadly similar semantics are discussed in Bach (1997; , Chalmers (2011 ), Cumming (2013 ), Forbes (1987 , Récanati (1993) , and Richard (1990) . In a separate vein, Evans (1982) insists that certain ordinary language attitude expressions have only a loose connection to the level of mental representation he calls
understanding. This is echoed in Chalmers (2011, p. 612) , Peacocke (1983, pp. 196-7) , and especially Goodman (2013; 2017) . However, it is sometimes unclear whether these authors mean to reject HARMONY (see Evans (1982, p. 129) ). I clarify and extend the latter train of thought by advancing a semantics akin to the former group of authors.
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The sort of contextualist I have in mind will deny that the speakers express the same semantic content in their respective uses of the sentence 'S Φs that p', for there are many belief-relations which can be expressed by the attitude verb 'believes'. Which belief-relation is expressed by a use of 'believes' at a context is partly determined by features of the (extra-linguistic) context, such as the purposes, expectations, and presuppositions of the speakers using these sentences. We might say that ordinary language propositional attitude verbs are indexical expressions. The moral, in any case, is that the role played by attitude-reporting sentences of the form 'S Φs that p' in our linguistic practice is not well-served by the specification of some unique and complete semantic content as their compositional semantic value.
This story will be developed in § §3-4. There are, of course, many ways of recognising context-sensitivity in attitude-reporting sentences. Assuming the phenomenon is triggered by some syntactic constituent at logical form, it may be located in the attitude verb (e.g. Richard, 1990) , in the complementiser 'that-' (e.g. Chalmers, 2011) , in some covert indexical (e.g. Schiffer, 1978) , or in the report's 'that-' clause: 'that p' (e.g. Récanati, 1993, p. 397) . Alternatively, we might take the relevant contextually determined propositional constituent to be 'unarticulated' (Crimmins and Perry, 1989 ). Or we might take the semantic content of 'S believes that p' on an occasion of use to be incomplete or underdetermined (Bach, 1994) . 14 My rationale for presupposing an indexical, 'verbalist' framework in this paper will become clear. on what a thinker must do in order that she fall under the ordinary language predicate 'believes that p' and, where p is a singular content, it is possible that those requirements are outstripped by the (context-invariant) requirements on entertaining a singular thought. In that case, SUFFICIENCY must be rejected. Some belief-relations one can bear to a singular content do not suffice for one's entertaining a singular thought. As we will see, those expressed by the uses of 'believes' in the contexts of (3) and (4) are of precisely this sort.
What is essential to this move is that the acquaintance theorist will adopt 'entertains' as a theoretical term of art, sensitive to the explanatory purposes of her theory of mind. In a variety of guises, philosophers have claimed that a thinker may fail to occupy a belief state, say, with the Despite the nomenclature, entertaining or endorsing a proposition need not be an occurrent mental act (unless, of course, one's theory of mind is only interested in specifying contents for these purposes). Though I may be accused of terminological abuse, I follow the precedents of Evans (1982) and Goodman (2017) Evans (1982) and Goodman (2013; 2017) appeal to the notion of 'entertaining', Peacocke (1983, pp. 196-7) to the 'Bel' relation, and Chalmers (2011) to 'endorsing'. Dorr (2011, pp. 940-1) similarly categorises Loar's (1988) notion of 'psychological content', Stalnaker's (1988) 'compatibility with a subject's beliefs', and Lewis'
(1979) 'the objects of belief'. See also Bach's (1997) claim that 'belief reports do not report beliefs' (p. 215). The core of the strategy against the argument in §1 is the rejection of SUFFICIENCY except at privileged, theoretical contexts. The rejection of SUFFICIENCY on its own is not a claim about the semantic structure of propositional attitude-reporting sentences. While those wedded to other accounts of propositional attitude reports may be attracted to rejecting SUFFICIENCY, my claim that SUFFICIENCY holds at certain privileged contexts (those, roughly, at which the speakers are engaged in the theory of mind) suggests that there are many belief-relations expressible by 'believes', some of which, when borne to a singular content, do suffice for the possession + of a singular thought. HARMONY will then come out true on any uniform interpretation of 'belief'
and 'believe' if we suppose that the context-sensitivity of attitude reports consists in the contextdependence of the 'belief' relation. § §3-5 show that this sort of picture of the connection between de re reports and singular thoughts can be clarified and motivated in an independently appealing way. This development, however, involves sacrificing neutrality on the semantics of propositional attitude-reporting sentences (and, given a contextualist treatment, on the source and nature of their context-sensitivity). 17 The rationale for maintaining SUFFICIENCY in qualified 16 This point is made by Chalmers (2011, p. 619) . 'Agreement' and 'disagreement' here are not to be thought of as attitude verbs but as relations to uses of sentences.
17 For reasons of space I am unable to provide an independent defence of verbalism over alternative treatments here, though responses to some natural objections against the view are provided in §4. I do presuppose that error-theoretic and pragmatic accounts of the attitude-reporting phenomena below are incorrect. Attributing rampant error to speakers (Braun, 1988) is simply difficult to justify. It is possible to supplement this semantic outlook with a pragmatic story which explains differences in our untutored reactions (Salmon (1986); Soames (1987) While we must reject the unqualified SUFFICIENCY principle, it is possible to claim that the appearance of the term of art 'singular thought' in SUFFICIENCY has the effect that, whenever SUFFICIENCY is uttered, it is true. Contextualists about knowledge have sometimes suggested that mere mention of a skeptical scenario is sufficient for its being a relevant alternative, a scenario which must be excluded by the subject if she is to possess the relevant piece of knowledge. Lewis (1996) suggests that the mere production of a knowledge report can suffice for the relevance of unattended-to possibilities:
I say S knows that P iff P holds in every possibility left uneliminated by S's (Lewis, 1996, pp. 561-2) .
If this is correct, it is possible to suggest that 'Knowing a proposition is sufficient for undermining Cartesian scepticism' will be true whenever uttered, despite the fact that it is not true with respect to every relation which can be expressed by a use of 'knows'. By analogy, it is semantic content and facts about use, draining the former of potential explanatory utility (see Récanati (1993, pp. 335-45) ).
Page 18 of 39 possible to claim that 'Believing a singular content is sufficient for entertaining a singular thought' will be true whenever uttered. In the first case, it is the standards for knowledge which are raised by the relevance of skeptical scenarios. In the latter, it is the standards for believing a singular content which are raised by the use of a theoretical term of art. For all that is to be said here, then, there may well remain a robust sense in which SUFFICIENCY is universally true.
Arguing for this in any detail, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, whether this is so is not especially important for our purposes. What is important is that as we explore the framework's attractive treatments of recalcitrant puzzle cases, the sacrifices made concerning the SUFFICIENCY principle shall come to seem independently plausible, complementing rather than undermining the considerations which made SUFFICIENCY seem like a natural principle to endorse.
Blueprint for a contextualist semantics
This section presents one particularly attractive shape for the sort of contextualist semantics discussed in §2 and begins to explore its puzzle-dissolving power. While its treatment of de re ascriptions is emphasised here, it will be clear that an account of de dicto ascriptions is also provided. In §4 I return to illustrate how the proposal should be used by acquaintance theorists to respond to the liberal's argument. For ease of exposition, I assume that contents have a Russellian structure, constituted by particulars, properties, and quasi-syntactic elements (see Salmon, 1986, pp. 143-51 Fodor (1990) , Millikan (2000) , Récanati (2012) , Richard (1990) , and Salmon (1986) .
19 I use 'determines' in connection with sticky propositions, reserving 'expresses' for semantic content proper.
Sticky propositions are simply set-theoretic entities to which we as theorists may appeal in stating the truthconditions of attitude reports. This framework is closest to Richard's (1990; , but the quasi-singular propositions of Schiffer (1978) et al. are also similar. Nonetheless, these writers do claim that 'RAMs' and quasi-singular propositions, respectively, are proper objects of belief (see, for example, Richard, 2013, p. 101) . We can define a context-dependent relation between the sticky propositions determined 
21
This will all become clearer once we get to looking at some puzzle cases. Before that, however, allow me to briefly clarify the role of sticky propositions. Sticky propositions are a settheoretic resource appealed to when stating the truth-conditions of attitude-reporting sentences.
They are not the objects of attitudes or the semantic values of sentences (certainly not if one takes there to be just one sort of entity which plays either of these roles). 'That-' clauses embed under quantificational and intensional operators in the usual way. We need not make sense of Let us first explore how the framework handles notorious 'Ortcutt' (or 'double vision') cases (introduced to the literature by Quine (1956) ). Suppose Ann is up late reading in bed when she hears suspicious rustling from outside. Fearing that her prize-winning vegetables are being sabotaged by a jealous neighbour, she steps out onto the porch, at time t, and fixes her gaze on 21 These truth-conditions will be augmented in §4.
the bushes from which all the noise seems to be coming. After some hesitation, she plucks up the courage to investigate. She supposes that her cat, Bruce, is likely trailing not far behind her.
But once Ann reaches the bushes she realises, at t', that Bruce-whom she had mistakenly locked outside-was responsible for the noise all along. Her two grandchildren, knowingly watching the events unfold from their window, might have had the following conversation at t, as Ann stepped outside: I take it that, in our scenario, the de re belief reports in (5) and (7) are false, while those in (6) and (8) are true. The important thing to note is that each conversation has its own standards for resolving which object-representation in Ann's mind is correlated with the use of 'Bruce'. These ways of resolving the unspecificity in which object-representation of the subject's is to be correlated with the name 'Bruce' are incompatible with one another. No single context would easily accommodate both conversational threads, since different requirements on correlation are in play. This explains the invalidity of the inference from (9) and (10) to (11): (9) Ann thinks that Bruce is Casey.
(10) Ann thinks that Bruce is curiously scampering around behind her.
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Quite generally, if the subject has multiple representational vehicles concerning a single thing (in the sense that it is in principle possible for them to rationally take conflicting attitudes + to contents which are singular with respect to that thing), there will be cases in which it is important for the context to resolve a de re ascription, for there will be multiple eligible candidates which may be correlated with the singular term in the reports 'that-' clause, and which one is correlated may affect the truth-value of the report.
In the first instance, correlation relates sticky propositions. It will be congenial in what follows, however, to also talk of correlation relations between the constituents of sticky propositions, in a derivative sense. 22 Ascriptions (5)- (8) briefly explored the mechanics of correlation between singular terms. But correlation extends to all sorts of expressions appearing in the 'that-' clauses of attitude reports. Suppose Lisa is trying to figure out where it would be best to hang a picture in her new office. Looking at the frame, she judges + it, explicitly, to be roughly 30 centimetres in length along each edge. At most contexts, the following report will intuitively be true:
Lisa thinks the frame is roughly 12 inches long.
In this case, the use of the predicate 'is roughly 12 inches long' is correlated with a vehicle exercised by Lisa which would, in certain stricter contexts (where the standards for correlation are more stringent), be truly reported only by instead using the predicate 'is roughly 30 centimetres long'. I will call contextual variation in what is required in order for two expressions to correlate the transparency/opacity scale. 22 Further motivation for taking sub-propositional correlation as derivative is suggested by cases in which it matters where in the sticky proposition a vehicle appears. (See the discussion of (12)- (13) The foregoing discussion should indicate the framework's general plausibility. This is important. If the semantics required by acquaintance theorists is independently motivated, the liberal's trademark argument should lose the force it has long been taken to have.
Consider, then, the solution it offers to a further puzzle case, much-discussed in recent literature. Rosaline, Maria, and Katherine are to attend a masked ball.
Each lady anticipates (tepidly) the attentions of a different suitor, and each suitor has given his lady a favour to wear, by which he hopes to recognize her during the masque. The ladies, with malice aforethought, decide to swap favours and so cause the suitors to 'woo contrary' (Cumming, 2007, p. 83) .
The exchange of favours is represented in the figure below.
- Figure 1 .
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At the evening's first dance, Biron, originally intended for Rosaline, takes Katherine's hand. Maria remarks:
(12) Biron thinks Katherine is Rosaline.
Her remark is true, yet in the same circumstances the following seems false:
23 (Cumming, 2007, p. 84) .
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The puzzle is that Biron appears to be irrational, at least assuming the 'is' here expresses identity (a symmetric relation), since he fails to believe a trivial logical consequence of what he believes.
Cumming (2007) uses this puzzle to suggest that names are not singular terms. Can our semantic framework provide a less dramatic treatment of the puzzle?
The parallels between (12)- (13) and (9)- (11) (12)- (13) and of 'Katherine' in (12)- (13) Biron's perceptual object-representation of the thing which is in fact Katherine is feeding into his standing file on Rosaline. 24 This condition is satisfied in our scenario, and so (12) comes out true.
Constructions in the form of (12) and (13) have a general tendency to promote transparent readings of the grammatical subject and opaque readings of the grammatical object.
25
24 While it is useful to adopt the 'file' metaphor here, I need not incur the commitments associated with prominent file-theorists (e.g. Récanati, 2012) . The notion of a representational vehicle I assume is lightweight, corresponding just to whatever cognitive resources a thinker reliably employs in her representations as of a particular object (or plurality). There is no assumption that these 'files' correspond to those talked about in, say, discourse representation theory. (Note that Cumming (2007, p. 85) , in his solution, appeals to 'deictic mental symbols used to track objects'.) 25 Not always, however. Suppose Rosaline scalds Biron. He might excuse himself with either 'I thought you were her!' or 'I thought she was you!' Likewise, there appear to be ways of making a use of (13) felicitous. Indeed, the same sort of explanation can be given of (13)'s falsity. In (13), 'Rosaline' appears transparently and 'Katherine' opaquely. What this means is that the constraints required for 'Rosaline' (roughly, given its grammatical position) to correlate with a representational vehicle in Biron's mind do not extend beyond preservation of reference. In contrast, the constraints required for 'Katherine' (roughly, given its grammatical position) to correlate with a representational vehicle in Biron's mind are more substantive. In file-talk, what the truth of (13) requires is, roughly, that information gathered by Biron's perceptual object-representation of the thing which is in fact Rosaline is feeding into his standing file on Katherine. This condition is not satisfied in our scenario, and so (13) comes out false. The truth in the vicinity, of course, is that Biron thinks Rosaline is Maria.
In sum, our framework explains the divergent truth-values of (12) and (13) as follows.
The 'that-' clause of Maria's utterance of (12) expresses the following sticky proposition:
At the context at which (12) is uttered, the sticky proposition its 'that-' clause expresses is correlated with at least one sticky proposition expressed by Biron's belief + state, namely:
In contrast, the sticky proposition determined by the 'that-' clause of an utterance of (13) at the same context, illustrated below, is not correlated with the above sticky proposition, nor with any other in the space of Biron's belief + state. Cumming (2007, p. 86, n. 16 ) brings this out using the following dialogue: 'Who does Biron think Rosaline is?';
'He thinks Rosaline is Katherine'. This fails to be correlated with the same sticky proposition with which the 'that-' clause of (12) is correlated partly due to the quasi-grammatical structure preserved by sticky propositions, in virtue of which the sticky proposition determined by (12) is distinct from that determined by (13). Again, constructions in the form of (12) and (13) have a quite general tendency to promote transparent readings of the grammatical subject and opaque readings of the grammatical object.
Before moving on to elucidate how the contextualist proposal above can be used in answer to the argument from attitude reports in §1, now is a good time to assuage a couple of 
Isn't it often true to ascribe beliefs to subjects concerning things about which they have no representational
vehicle? I venture that you, the reader, believe that Palermo is north of Malawi and that 7935 + 8226 = 16161, despite you having never explicitly reflected on the matter. Often these are called 'tacit' or 'dispositional' beliefs, the idea being that while the subject does not believe + the proposition attributed, they could be brought to do so with gentle coaxing given what they do believe + . There is simply no requirement in the proposal articulated here that there must be a representational vehicle in the mind of the subject for each expression in the 'that-' clause of a true attitude report. There may often be cases in which a vehicle in fact utilised by the subject bears an underwhelming relationship to one used in the 'that-' clause of a true attitude report, contextual standards being sufficiently weak as to permit correlation nonetheless. If, say, a
Page 28 of 39 subject lacks the aesthetic concept yugen, it can still be appropriate to ascribe to them beliefs in the instantiation of this property if their response to a certain piece of art is suitably suggestive, just like, more dramatically, it can be appropriate to ascribe to a chess-playing computer the belief that it should get its queen out early on the basis of its playing patterns. 26 In each of these cases, the representational system may have some low-level or approximate representation of the thing(s) in question, which is apt, at felicitous contexts, to be a constituent in a correlated sticky proposition. But if there are cases where it does not, we can allow that the sticky proposition determined by a 'that-' clause may correlate with a 'gappy' sticky proposition-a sequence containing the R-proposition some of whose constituents fail to be associated with vehicles of the subject's belief + state.
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What I have been concerned to provide in this section is a promising elaboration of the kind of contextualist framework required by the acquaintance-theorist in her response to the argument from attitude reports in §1. This remains a blueprint, requiring more sophisticated refinement in its details. We turn now to its deployment.
Correlation without co-valuation
We are now in a position to use our contextualist semantics to motivate a fresh look at the reporting data represented by (3), which form the heart of the argument against CONSTRAINT.
De re attitude ascriptions require for their truth that the singular sticky proposition determined by 'that S' be correlated, by contextually determined standards, with a sticky proposition determined by the attributee's attitude + state. Most of those who have discussed the general sort of semantics I am offering for attitude ascriptions have taken sameness of R- 26 The latter example is Dennett's (1978) .
27 Richard (2013, pp. 13-25) provides a detailed discussion of accommodating dispositional attitudes in the present sort of framework. proposition to be a necessary condition for the truth of an ascription. 28 In that case, the sticky proposition determined by the subject's attitude + state must also be singular. However, we
should reject the principle that correlation requires 'co-valuation' (sameness of semantic value).
Some attitude ascriptions do not demand for their truth that the R-proposition be preserved across correlation. This will be the key to providing truth-conditions for ascriptions such as (3).
In the scenario of (3), a (fairly idealised) toy model of the sticky proposition determined by the Queen's belief + state would be:
Q is a representational vehicle whose translation into English might be 'the top-performing spy chosen by the assistants'. 29 This expresses a quantificational constituent of a Russellian proposition, x Fx. R 2 Q expresses the property is a hero. In contrast, the sticky proposition determined by the 'that-' clause of M's report in (3) is:
Here, b is the res of the ascription-Bond himself. In this case, the R-proposition is not preserved across correlation. The R-proposition of M's use of 'Bond is a hero' in (3) is < b, is a hero >, whereas the R-proposition corresponding to the relevant sticky proposition determined by the Queen's belief + state is < x Fx, is a hero >. In spite of this, our contextualist semantics 28 Fodor (1990) and Richard (1990; inter alia explicitly endorse this constraint; only Chalmers (2011 ), Goodman (2013 2017) , and Récanati (1993) reject it.
29 I idealize here in many ways, of course. It is also unlikely that the description is purely qualitative-lacking any singular material for, e.g., time and location. But the description need not contain a term referring to Bond. In a slogan, then: correlation does not require co-valuation. Indeed, at some contexts, mental correlates of indefinite descriptions appear to suffice for the truth of a de re attitude report. Recall the case of (4). There, the standards in play at the context are sufficiently diluted as to allow Alice's descriptive content-vehicle (akin to 'all philosophers') to be correlated with Phyllis' use of 'I'.
The principal goal in this paper has been to offer an attractive way of defending the conjunction of acquaintance-theoretic conceptions of singular thought with natural semantic principles linking singular thought to our ordinary talk about the attitudes. The contextualist semantics articulated here allows this. Moreover, it does so in a way which preserves the traditional acquaintance-theoretic explanation of the falsity of reports like (2), above. These sorts of cases are those which take place at contexts at which the standards required for correlation are not so diluted that correlation between attributor's singular (sticky) proposition and attributee's descriptive (sticky) proposition suffices for the report's truth. And, in order to entertain a singular content about some spy, Ralph must be acquainted with that spy. The mere fact that cases like (3) are possible does not infringe on this sort of explanation. Despite the claims of prominent liberals that 'CONSTRAINT has no explanatory value whatsoever when it comes to the acceptability of [de re] attitude reports' (Hawthorne and Manley, 2012, p. 39) , then, acquaintance
can have a systematic role to play in the truth-conditions of attitude reports, after all. 99-117)). Making the case for one of these would require a long digression. The only observation I wish to make is that these readings appear to run against the co-valuation principle.
The report's 'that-' clause expresses a proposition which has, as a constituent, the property of being a hat like the speaker's. But Fodor's (1970) point is that the proposition Charley entertains has a different property as a constituent: namely, the property of being a Dodgers hat.
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In the remainder of the paper, I briefly discuss an important and unacknowledged obstacle to positing violations of the co-valuation principle. Removing this obstacle is crucial to safeguarding the acquaintance theorist's response to the argument from attitude reports.
Barriers to rejecting co-valuation
Consider the following sort of case used by Chalmers (2011, pp. 615-6) to motivate a rejection of his analogue of the co-valuation principle. Yusuf and Zoe are basketball coaches for children.
Yusuf notes:
(15) Jack is tall.
His use of 'tall' at the context picks out the property tall1. Later, Zoe is alone coaching young adults. At the later context, a similar use of 'tall' would pick out a different property: tall2. At this context, Chalmers (2011, p. 615) observes, 'Jack is tall' would be false. Jack may be tall for a child, but he is short compared to the young adults. Nevertheless, Zoe's report (16) Yusuf believes that Jack is tall.
remains intuitively true, despite the fact that a use of 'tall' at her context picks out tall2 as opposed to tall1. In the terms of the semantic framework adopted here, the truth of Zoe's ascription seems to require correlation between the two sticky propositions below. Chalmers (2011) concludes that if we are to account for the truth of Zoe's utterance of (16), we must reject the co-valuation principle, for tall1 and tall2 are distinct properties.
Unfortunately, we cannot motivate denials of the co-valuation principle in this way.
There may be cases in which the two relevant R-propositions differ in truth-value. And where the attitude verb of the report is factive, it might be that instances of the following (arguably nonnegotiable) inference pattern fail to hold: where Y is a factive attitude verb, S Ys that p.
It is a corollary of Chalmers' (2011) claims about the above case that the following report may be true (as used at a context c) despite the falsity of 'Jack is tall' (as used at c).
(17) Yusuf knows that Jack is tall.
This happens if, as in the scenario described, the R-proposition entertained by Yusuf, < j, tall1 >, is true while the R-proposition expressed by the 'that-' clause of the attitude report, < j, tall2 >, is false, since the individual (Jack) fails to instantiate the property tall2. In that case, a variety of inference patterns which seem constitutive of factive attitude verbs are invalid:
Someone knows that p.
Therefore, p.
In fact, the problem extends beyond arguments involving factive attitude verbs to arguments otherwise about the truth-values of beliefs. For example, the following pattern of argument is intuitively valid:
Yusuf believes that p. It is not the case that p.
Therefore, Yusuf believes falsely that p.
I take it that the acquaintance theorist should refrain from motivating her rejection of the covaluation principle in the way suggested by Chalmers (2011) . But the more general threat is that any account which posits violations of the co-valuation principle may invalidate the inference patterns above. And this is a consequence worth avoiding. Before closing, then, I explain our intuitive assessment of the truth of (16) and (17) in a way which preserves not only the plausible inference patterns above but also the violations of co-valuation needed by the acquaintancetheorist.
While there are felicitous readings of (16) and (17), it is worth remembering that the context is ex hypothesi one at which a use of (15) comes out false. This makes the fact that the reporter nonetheless decides to say Yusuf knows or believes that it is true a little mysterious. It is natural to instead suggest that (16) and (17) are true at the later context only to the extent that a use of (15) might itself come out true at that same context. Context-sensitive expressions can be used deferentially. In Zoe's use of the expression 'tall ' (in (16) and (17)), there is a covert argumentplace for the old context at which 'tall' expresses a property Jack does instantiate. To the extent that the report is true, it is not the case that it is true while its 'that-' clause expresses the same proposition as the false use of (the homophonous but perhaps distinct construction) 'Jack is tall' to which Chalmers (2011) draws our attention. In that case the above inference patterns can be safely preserved along with the truth of (16) and (17) in the envisaged scenario.
That context-sensitive expressions like 'tall' can be used deferentially should not be surprising. It is well-known that terms like 'local' can be used in precisely this way. The It is not the case that there is a local bar (i.e. local to the speaker) that sells beer.
Therefore, Dave falsely believes there is a local barD (i.e. local to Dave) that sells beer.
Crucially, none of these issues impair our proposed treatment of reports such as (3), which entails violations of co-valuation. The R-proposition expressed by the 'that-' clause of the report, < b, is a hero >, entails the truth of the R-proposition expressed by the belief + state of the Queen, < x Fx, is a hero >. The R-proposition entertained by the Queen, being quantificational, is at a level of generality above the singular R-proposition expressed by the attributor's 'that-' clause.
Given that in these kinds of cases, to which the liberal's argument appeals, the attributors refer to some thing which in fact satisfies the description entertained by the subject, it will not be the case that a corresponding knowledge report is true at some context c despite the falsity of the Rproposition expressed by the report's 'that-' clause at c. And so, given that Bond is the unique individual picked out by x Fx as tokened by the Queen's belief + state, it will not be the case that (18), below, is true at a context c despite the falsity of the R-proposition expressed by 'Bond is a hero' at c.
(18) The Queen knows that Bond is a hero.
This pattern will hold throughout the cases to which liberals appeal in the argument against 
Conclusion
Given the flexibility of the contextualist semantics articulated here, it is possible to reconcile HARMONY and the intuitive truth-value assignments for de re attitude reports like (3) and (4) with very demanding views on what it takes to be acquainted with an object. It was dialectically important here to show that the acquaintance theorist has the resources to accommodate any case conceived of by the arguer in which a de re attitude report about S is intuitively true without S being acquainted with the res. A result of this is that the acquaintance theorist has the resources to view virtually all of our ordinary attitude reporting practices as taking place at contexts where the standards for correlation fall far short of those imposed by her theoretical, joint-carving terms of art-'entertains', 'singular thought', etc. It might be that scenarios like (3), or even (4), most closely model the ascription practices of the folk, if most of the thoughts we entertain about objects in the world are taken to be mediated by descriptions (à la Russell (1910/11) ). More generally, we might worry that detaching (to a context-dependent degree) a theoretical account of singular thought from the data of ordinary language, de re attitude reports leaves us with scant data to govern such an account in the first place. Accordingly, the broader upshot of the strategy defended here is double-edged. While the framework liberates us to consider even the most demanding conceptions of 'acquaintance', as it appears in CONSTRAINT, it highlights the urgency of an appraisal of the theoretical-explanatory role of singular thought. 
